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PATH TO A POPULAR VOTE: THE IMPACT OF 
STATE FAITHLESS ELECTOR STATUTES ON 
THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN 
Laura LaBrecque* 
INTRODUCTION 
Desire to reform the Electoral College is not at all novel, nor is 
the debate over the correct way to do so. Since its inception as one of 
the most significant compromises to come out of the Constitutional 
Convention, the Electoral College has been consistently challenged by 
politicians, scholars, and the American people.1 As the United States 
has become even more polarized, and after two presidential elections 
in recent memory, in 2000 and 2016, when the winner of the Electoral 
College did not win the popular vote, outcries for Electoral College 
reform remain as fervent as ever.2 
One effort to change the Electoral College is the National Popular 
Vote Plan, an agreement between states to install a national popular 
vote without constitutional amendment; once enough states join for 
the plan to become effective, states’ electors will cast their ballots for 
the national popular vote winner regardless of the vote leader in their 
state.3 The plan purports to solve the issues inherent in the winner-
take-all Electoral College system, where votes cast in different states 
have an unequal impact, states yield different levels of power in the 
presidential election, and presidential candidates need only focus their 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, 
Boston University, 2018. Special thanks to Professor Aaron Caplan for his immense guidance and 
helpful suggestions throughout the writing process, and thank you to the members of the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review for all their hard work throughout the production cycle. 
 1. See Brandon H. Robb, Comment, Making the Electoral College Work Today: The 
Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 54 LOY. L. REV. 
419, 427 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, Getting Rid of the Electoral College Isn’t Just About 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/opinion/electoral-
college-warren-trump.html. 
 3. Robb, supra note 1, at 453–55. Throughout this Note, I will use the term “Electors” to 
mean members of the Electoral College. 
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campaign efforts on certain parts of the country.4 Because the plan 
does not replace the Electoral College, though, and rather utilizes 
members of the Electoral College who vote for the national popular 
vote winner, the plan by itself does not solve all issues with the 
Electoral College.5 
Notably, the National Popular Vote Plan could be complicated by 
the recent uptick in “faithless Electors.” While faithless Electors, who 
vote for a presidential candidate other than the winner of the popular 
vote in their state for various reasons, have not yet impacted a 
presidential election, these Electors have the ability to completely 
undermine the plan by voting for someone other than the national 
popular vote winner.6 To combat faithless Electors, states have 
enacted laws attempting to bind their Electors into voting for the 
popular vote winner in the state.7 These Elector-binding statutes could 
ensure the effectiveness of the National Popular Vote Plan. 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Chiafalo v. Washington8 
established that states can enforce their Elector-binding statutes to 
ensure faithful votes.9 This Note provides a new categorization of the 
state Elector-binding statutes, focusing on the statutes’ enforcement 
mechanisms to determine which types of statutes would most 
effectively ensure that the National Popular Vote Plan works. The 
statutes are divided into three types: “Honor System” statutes that 
either merely state that the Elector must vote for the candidate who 
wins the popular vote in the state or require the Elector to take a pledge 
to that effect;10 “Replacement” statutes, which mandate that if the 
Elector votes for someone other than the candidate who wins the 
popular vote, the Elector will be replaced;11 and “Penalty” statutes that 
 
 4. JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE 
PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 11 (4th ed. 2013), http://www.every-vote-
equal.com/sites/default/files/everyvoteequal-4th-ed-2013-02-21.pdf. 
 5. Id. at xxxviii (“The concept has too often been referred to by opponents as a ‘partisan’ or 
even ‘liberal’ effort to eliminate the Electoral College in an attempt to tarnish the issue and scare 
away those of us on the right side of the political spectrum. But this description could not be further 
from the truth.”). 
 6. Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of the Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing Just 
Below the Surface in Choosing the President, 100 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 121, 130 (2006). 
 7. See infra Part III and Appendix A. 
 8. 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 9. Id. at 2320. 
 10. See Appendix A, Table 1. 
 11. See Appendix A, Table 2. 
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impose a penalty on Electors for voting for someone other than the 
candidate who wins the popular vote in the state.12 
This Note argues that states should enact Elector-binding statutes 
that require the replacement of Electors who vote faithlessly. 
Additionally, this Note contends that regardless of whether the 
National Popular Vote Plan were enacted, the enforceability of state 
Elector-binding statutes allows states to remove political parties from 
the process of appointing Electors.  
Part I of this Note presents background information on the 
National Popular Vote Plan and the history of faithless votes in the 
Electoral College. Part II then describes the three Supreme Court 
decisions that establish the constitutionality of state Elector-binding 
statutes and their enforcement, McPherson v. Blacker,13 Ray v. Blair,14 
and Chiafalo v. Washington. Part III provides a new categorization of 
state Elector-binding statutes, charted in Appendices A and B. Finally, 
Part IV considers the implications of the Chiafalo decision on the 
National Popular Vote Plan’s effectiveness, analyzes which types of 
state Elector-binding statutes would best allow the National Popular 
Vote Plan to work, and considers whether political parties need be 
included in state Elector appointment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The National Popular Vote Plan 
In the mid to late 1900s, Congress repeatedly attempted to reform 
the Electoral College through constitutional amendment, but the 
barriers to amending the Constitution proved too strong.15 Given the 
unlikelihood of amendment, toward the end of the century, momentum 
towards changing or abolishing the Electoral College all but died.16 
However, following the incredibly close 2000 presidential election, 
which marked the fourth time in American history that the winner of 
 
 12. See Appendix A, Table 3. 
 13. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 14. 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
 15. THOMAS H. NEALE & ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43823, THE NATIONAL 
POPULAR VOTE (NPV) INITIATIVE: DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT BY INTERSTATE 
COMPACT 4 (2019). 
 16. See Robb, supra note 1, at 452. 
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the presidential election did not win the popular vote, the movement 
resurged.17 
As a direct result of the rising frustrations with the Electoral 
College, and in an attempt to circumvent the challenging constitutional 
amendment process, three law professors created the National Popular 
Vote Plan (NPV).18 The NPV does not eliminate the Electoral College, 
but seeks to take advantage of the states’ constitutional power to 
appoint Electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct.”19 Under the NPV, individual state legislatures adopt the 
“Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National 
Popular Vote,” which prescribes that the state shall award all of its 
Electoral votes to the presidential candidate who wins the national 
popular vote.20 The individual state statutes then only take effect when 
enough states join the plan to ensure the national popular vote winner 
will have the requisite 270 Electoral votes.21 At present, the NPV has 
been adopted by fifteen states and the District of Columbia, for a total 
of 195 Electoral votes.22 Appendix B following this Note contains a 
table listing which states have adopted the NPV thus far.23 
In the event that a sufficient number of states join the NPV such 
that it is enacted, the mechanics of the plan, as enacted by the member 
 
 17. NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 15, at 5, 15. The first time the winner of the presidential 
election did not win the popular vote was the election of 1824, where Andrew Jackson secured a 
plurality of the votes, but John Quincy Adams won the Electoral College. Jerry Schwartz, 
Explainer: They Lost the Popular Vote but Won the Elections, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/article/AP-explains-elections-popular-vote-743f5cb6c70fce9489c9926a90785 
5eb. The next time this occurred was in the election of 1876. Id. Rutherford B. Hayes won the 
Electoral College, leaving Samuel Tilden with the popular vote win just shy of the requisite number 
of Electoral votes to win the presidency. Id. The election of 1888 marked the third time, when 
Grover Cleveland won the popular vote over Benjamin Harrison, with Harrison securing the 
Electoral College victory (Grover Cleveland would, of course, go on to win the next election for 
his second term). See id. The fourth and fifth times the winner of the Electoral College did not win 
the popular vote were in the contested elections of 2000 and 2016, where George W. Bush and 
Donald Trump, respectively, secured the presidency. Id. 
 18. NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 15, at 6. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 258. 
 20. KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259 (“The presidential elector certifying official of each 
member state shall certify the appointment in that official’s own state of the elector slate nominated 
in that state in association with the national popular vote winner.”). 
 21. Id. (“This agreement shall take effect when states cumulatively possessing a majority of 
the electoral votes have enacted this agreement in substantially the same form and the enactments 
by such states have taken effect in each state.”). 
 22. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, 
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
 23. See Appendix B. 
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states thus far, are fairly simple.24 Each state in the NPV would 
conduct an ordinary statewide election for President and Vice 
President.25 Then, before all Electors meet in their respective states to 
cast their votes, the “chief election official” in each member state, 
typically the state’s Secretary of State or similar official, must 
determine the winner of the popular vote in the state and ultimately 
communicate that to the other member states.26 The national popular 
vote total encompasses the popular votes of all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia, regardless of whether the jurisdiction has 
enacted the NPV.27 In the count of Electoral votes by Congress, all of 
each member state’s Electoral votes would be allocated to the national 
popular vote winner.28 The text of the NPV includes provisions which 
apply in cases of a national popular vote tie or where states have an 
unequal number of nominated Electors to Electoral votes in the state.29 
Lastly, the NPV provides that states may withdraw from the agreement 
at any time, but, to protect against strategically timed withdrawals, if 
a state withdraws after July 20 of the election year, the withdrawal 
does not become effective until after the next president is 
inaugurated.30 
Proponents of the NPV argue that the plan would solve the most 
significant shortcomings of the current Electoral College system of 
electing the President and Vice President.31 Specifically, the plan’s 
creators and advocates argue that, in addition to reflecting the national 
popular vote, adoption of the NPV would make every state relevant to 
presidential elections.32 Under the current winner-take-all system for 
Electoral votes, presidential candidates are disincentivized from 
 
 24. In the fifteen states and the District of Columbia where the NPV has been enacted, the 
states have adopted the text of the “Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National 
Popular Vote” verbatim. See Appendix B; see, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6921 (Deering 2021). The 
NPV Agreement itself requires the member states to enact the Agreement in “substantially the same 
form.” KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259. 
 25. KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259. 
 26. Id. at 259, 263. 
 27. Id. at 263. 
 28. Id. at 259. 
 29. In the event of a national popular vote tie, the Electors of a state would vote for the popular 
vote winner in that state. Id. If the number of Electors in a state is less than or greater than the 
number of the state’s Electoral votes, the national popular vote winner nominates additional 
Electors as needed. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1. 
 32. Id. at 255. 
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campaigning in states in which they will easily win or convincingly 
lose.33 Thus, voters in non-“battleground” states are “effectively 
disenfranchised.”34 Additionally, NPV creators and advocates claim 
the plan would make votes in every state “equal,” solving the current 
issue where voters’ votes have disparate importance depending on 
where voters are located.35 Voters in small states have a greater ability 
to influence Electoral College votes than voters in larger states.36 
Enaction of the NPV, according to its proponents, would make every 
single state in the United States relevant to the presidential election, 
and every vote would count equally.37 
Opponents of the NPV believe the plan violates both the text of 
the Constitution and the Founders’ intent. Critics argue that the NPV 
is unconstitutional on its face in two central ways. First, opponents 
argue it violates the Compact Clause of Article I, Section 10, which 
forbids states from entering into interstate agreements without 
Congress’s consent.38 Critics contend the NPV would be considered a 
“compact” requiring congressional approval because it “would 
enhance the political power of the member States in a way that 
encroaches upon the supremacy of the United States” or “impairs the 
sovereign rights of nonmember states.”39 It is quite unlikely that 
Congress would approve the plan, as smaller states and swing states 
that reap the benefits of the lopsided Electoral College system in 
presidential elections would defeat it.40 
Second, opponents argue that the NPV is unconstitutional 
because it “exceeds the states’ constitutionally delegated authority” 
under Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.41 These critics of 
the NPV view that section’s grant of power to the states to appoint 
 
 33. Id. at 11. 
 34. Id. at 12. 
 35. Id. at 51. 
 36. Id. at 55. 
 37. Id. at 53. 
 38. Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 1523, 1539. 
 39. William G. Ross, Popular Vote Compact: Fraught with Constitutional Perils, JURIST 
(Feb. 28, 2012, 1:00 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2012/02/william-ross-vote-
compact/ (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472, 477 (1978)). 
 40. See David Gringer, Note, Why the National Popular Vote Plan Is the Wrong Way to 
Abolish the Electoral College, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 222 (2008) (“[The Electoral College’s] 
defenders often assert that without the electoral college, small states would ‘have no voting clout 
at all.’”). 
 41. Williams, supra note 38, at 1583. 
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their presidential Electors as limited in scope to that power alone.42 
They conclude that because the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly 
grant states the power to select Electors based on the national popular 
vote, and states’ Electors have not historically voted in accordance 
with the national popular vote, the state power to appoint is a mere 
formality.43 
Moreover, opponents believe the NPV is contrary to the Framers’ 
intent in creating the Electoral College and thus a non-majoritarian 
democracy.44 The Framers “expressly rejected” popular election of the 
President in order to protect smaller states’ interests.45 Because the 
Framers viewed the presidential Electors as “guardians possessing 
great wisdom, exhibiting superior character, and exercising 
independent judgment,” opponents of the NPV view the plan as 
directly antithetical to the Framers’ intentions when the Electoral 
College was established.46 
The NPV would likely survive both constitutional challenges, 
though. The Compact Clause would not prove a tough hurdle to 
surmount. The Supreme Court has held that some types of interstate 
agreements do not qualify as “compacts” requiring congressional 
approval.47 Under the precedent established in U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Commission,48 the NPV would not be considered an 
interstate agreement qualifying as a “compact” requiring 
congressional approval because the NPV member states are not 
“collectively creating a new power that they [do] not already have 
individually.”49 The agreement only implicates an area where the 
federal government has an interest, but not exclusive power, given that 
the U.S. Constitution allows for states to choose Electors however they 
choose.50 Thus, the NPV does not require congressional approval, nor 
 
 42. Id. at 1573–74 (“[T]he states’ power to regulate the manner of presidential elections is far 
more limited than the proponents of the [National Popular Vote Plan] contend. . . . That the states 
generally have the power to choose the manner in which their electors are selected begins the 
constitutional analysis; it does not end it.”). 
 43. Id. at 1532, 1573–81. 
 44. Id. at 1577. 
 45. Id. at 1528; NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 15, at 18–19. 
 46. See Williams, supra note 38, at 1559. 
 47. Id. at 1539. 
 48. 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
 49. Michael Brody, Circumventing the Electoral College: Why the National Popular Vote 
Interstate Compact Survives Constitutional Scrutiny Under the Compact Clause, 5 LEGIS. & POL’Y 
BRIEF 33, 45 (2013). 
 50. Id. at 45–46. 
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does it exceed the states’ authority under the U.S. Constitution, as 
opponents argue.51 
Assuming constitutionality, in order for the NPV to work, states 
must be able to effectively ensure that Electors will actually vote for 
the winner of the national popular vote. The extensive arguments for 
and against the NPV mirror and complement the arguments for and 
against binding Electors. Both proponents of the NPV and states with 
Elector-binding statutes seize on the language in Article II, Section 1 
that states have the power to appoint Electors in any manner as 
justification. On the other hand, opponents of the NPV, often 
proponents of discretion of Electors to vote faithlessly, believe that 
appointment power is not unlimited. 
B.  The Electoral College 
1.  Constitutional Provisions 
The U.S. Constitution does not describe the Electoral College or 
the states’ roles in the presidential election system in much detail. 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 gives states the mandate and the power 
to appoint Electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct,” so long as the Electors appointed are not Senators or 
Representatives and do not hold an “Office of Trust or Profit under the 
United States.”52 Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 then details the 
procedures for Elector voting and for counting the Elector votes in the 
U.S. Senate.53 Additionally, the Twelfth Amendment directs Electors 
to vote separately for the President and Vice President.54 The U.S. 
Constitution gives no further indication as to how the Electors should 
be appointed, how the Electors must vote, or what happens if the 
Electors vote a certain way. 
2.  Faithless Electors 
The lack of constitutional clarity regarding the Electoral College 
has led to state discretion in the allocation of Electoral votes. In all 
states, state election laws require that the political parties each choose 
 
 51. The constitutionality of the NPV is beyond the scope of this Note. For additional 
information regarding constitutional arguments on both sides, see Brody, supra note 49, and 
Williams, supra note 38. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 53. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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a slate of potential Electors prior to the general election.55 These 
Electors are individuals chosen for their loyalty or service to the 
political parties, or the individuals have some connection to the party’s 
candidate.56 However, states differ in their methods for allocating 
Electoral votes after the general election. Forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted winner-take-all systems for 
awarding their Electoral votes to ensure states maximized their 
influence in selecting a president.57 Under the winner-take-all 
approach, all of a state’s Electoral votes are allocated to the winner of 
the popular vote in that state.58 Thus, only the Electors from the 
political party whose candidate wins the state’s popular vote cast their 
vote.59 
On the other hand, the remaining two states, Maine and Nebraska, 
allocate their Electoral votes through a district system.60 In these 
states, two Electors at large cast their votes for the presidential 
candidate who wins the statewide popular vote, while Electors of each 
congressional district cast their votes for the candidates who win such 
districts.61 Like in winner-take-all systems, in Maine and Nebraska, 
the political parties select a slate of Electors at their conventions, and 
Electors of the parties who win each district and the state popular vote 
cast their electoral votes.62 Under the district system, then, 
theoretically Electors from both political parties could cast their votes, 
compared to the winner-take-all system where only one party’s 
Electors cast ballots. In both the winner-take-all system and the district 
system, though, so-called “faithless Electors” who vote for a candidate 
 
 55. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.020 (2021) (“Each political party shall select a number 
of candidates for electors of President and Vice-President of the United States equal to the number 
of senators and representatives to which the state is entitled in Congress. The candidates for electors 
shall be selected by the state party convention or in any other manner prescribed by the bylaws of 
the party.”). 
 56. About the Electors, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/electoral-
college/electors (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 57. Craig J. Herbst, Note, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with 
the District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 230 (2012); The Electoral College, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/the-electoral-college.aspx. 
 58. Herbst, supra note 57, at 230. 
 59. The Electoral College, supra note 57. 
 60. Id. 
 61. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 805(2) (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2) (2021). 
 62. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 321; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-710. 
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other than the party’s nominee undermine the states’ ability to control 
the allocation of their electoral votes.63 
a.  History and the Occurrence of Faithless Electors in Close 
Elections 
Historically and customarily, most Electors vote for their party’s 
candidate if that candidate wins the state's popular vote.64 However, 
according to FairVote.org, a nonprofit that advocates for a national 
popular vote election, 165 faithless electoral votes for a presidential or 
vice-presidential candidate other than the Elector’s party candidate 
have been cast in U.S. history.65 Of course, in some cases, these votes 
were faithless not out of a desire to be rebellious but for practical 
reasons.66 For example, when party candidates died in the past, 
Electors were forced to change their vote before the Electoral College 
convened.67 Since 1900, only sixteen true faithless votes were cast, 
and these faithless votes have largely been symbolic.68 Though 
faithless votes have not yet determined any presidential elections, the 
problem of the faithless Elector lurks, with the possibility of a 
constitutional crisis in polarized and close elections like those in 2000 
and 2016.69 Indeed, in 2016, the Electoral College saw the largest 
number of faithless votes in U.S. history amid the highly contentious 
election of Donald Trump.70 A scenario in which a state’s slate of 
Electors votes for someone other than that state’s popular vote winner, 
possibly becoming the 270th of the requisite 270 electoral votes 
needed to win the presidency, has the potential to completely 
undermine voter faith in the election system.71 
 
 63. Alexander Gouzoules, The “Faithless Elector” and 2016: Constitutional Uncertainty 
After the Election of Donald Trump, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 215, 215–16 (2017). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Faithless Electors, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors (last updated 
July 6, 2020); Nina Agrawal, All the Times in U.S. History that Members of the Electoral College 
Voted Their Own Way, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-faithless-electors-2016-story.html. 
 66. See Faithless Electors, supra note 65. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Agrawal, supra note 65. 
 69. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 124. 
 70. Drew Penrose, Faithless Electors Fizzle, but Leave Uncertainty, FAIRVOTE (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors_fizzle. 
 71. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 123. 
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b.  Faithless Electors Would Undermine the NPV 
The occurrence of faithless Electors also has the potential to 
disrupt the NPV if the plan were enacted in a sufficient number of 
states. The NPV does not eliminate the Electoral College, so it does 
not eliminate the possibility of faithless Electors.72 The plan simply 
requires that, instead of voting for the winner of the popular vote in 
the state when the Electors convene (or, in Maine and Nebraska, the 
winner of the popular vote in the state and the districts), Electors must 
vote for the national popular vote winner.73 In fact, the text of the NPV 
bill itself is similar to how most states currently appoint Electors, 
appointing the “Elector slate nominated in that state in association 
with the national popular vote winner.”74 While Electors would be 
associated with the national popular vote winner, association with a 
particular candidate has not prevented faithless votes in the past, 
particularly in the 2016 election.75 The NPV could present a scenario 
in which an Elector is unhappy with a particular candidate winning the 
national popular vote, even if that candidate is from their political 
party, and thus cast a faithless vote. By itself, the NPV does not solve 
the faithless Elector problem and could potentially exacerbate it. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ELECTOR-BINDING STATUTES AND 
PENALTIES 
The Supreme Court has examined the states’ power in relation to 
presidential Electors a few times. The Court first explored the states’ 
power of Elector appointment in McPherson v. Blacker in 1892.76 The 
Supreme Court next considered whether statutes that conditioned 
Elector appointment on support for the party’s primary candidate were 
constitutional in the 1952 case, Ray v. Blair.77 Most recently, a split in 
lower courts on whether similar state statutes to those in Ray, but 
which included enforcement mechanisms in addition to simple Elector 
promises, led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo v. 
Washington.78 
 
 72. KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 258 
 73. Id. at 264. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Penrose, supra note 70. 
 76. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 77. 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
 78. 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
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A.  McPherson v. Blacker 
Following the 1888 presidential election in which Grover 
Cleveland won the popular vote but lost in the Electoral College, 
Michigan, run by a Democratic legislature, sought to secure a 
Democratic victory for Cleveland.79 Thus, Michigan enacted a statute 
changing the state from a winner-take-all state to a district system for 
the 1892 election.80 Several nominees for Elector, including William 
McPherson, Jr., filed suit against the Michigan Secretary of State, 
Robert R. Blacker, seeking to have the statute declared 
unconstitutional.81 The Electors argued the statute was in conflict with 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, largely 
reasoning that because that section states that “each State shall 
appoint” its Electors, each individual state must act as one unit.82 Thus, 
the Electors argued, dividing up the state’s electoral votes by district 
would not be appointment of Electors by the state.83 
In its first decision addressing the states’ power of appointment 
of Electors, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Michigan statute.84 The Court rejected the Electors’ argument in the 
case, explaining that the act of appointment, regardless of whether the 
state is a winner-take-all or district system, is an act of the state as a 
whole.85 Most notably, the Court said that the “practical construction” 
of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution “has 
conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the 
appointment of electors,” and the “appointment and mode of 
appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States.”86 Though 
the Court concluded this in the context of the state enacting a district 
system by statute, which other states had similarly legislated at various 
times up until 1892, the Court’s expansive language suggests that the 
states’ appointment power is absolute. 
 
 79. Paul Egan, Democrats Once Pulled the Same Electoral College Stunt, DET. FREE PRESS 
(Nov. 21, 2014, 3:57 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/20/michigan-
white-house-presidential-election-electoral-college/70028908/. 
 80. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 1. The statute was repealed, and Michigan returned to a winner-
take-all state following the 1892 election, when Republicans gained legislative and executive 
control in Michigan. Egan, supra note 79. 
 81. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 2. 
 82. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2). 
 83. Id. at 11. 
 84. Id. at 4–6. 
 85. Id. at 25–26. 
 86. Id. at 35. 
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B.  Ray v. Blair 
In Ray v. Blair, an Alabama statute required that candidates for 
Elector promise to support the winner of the Democratic Party’s 
primary in the general election.87 One candidate for Elector in the 
Party, Edmund Blair, refused to take this pledge, and as a result, the 
chairman of the Executive Committee for the Alabama Democratic 
Party did not certify Blair as an Elector.88 The Alabama Supreme 
Court held that the pledge violated the Twelfth Amendment because 
Electors are “constitutional officer[s],” mandated to use their own 
discretion in exercising their duties.89 
The Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court, 
holding that “[n]either the language of Art. II, § 1, nor that of the 
Twelfth Amendment forbids a party to require from candidates in its 
primary a pledge of political conformity with the aims of the party.”90 
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged the challenges inherent in 
Elector-binding statutes, where Electors perform a federal function, 
but are actually state-appointed.91 The Court addressed the argument 
that the Founders intended for Electors to exercise their own judgment, 
and therefore a promise to vote a certain way interferes with their 
“constitutional duty.”92 The Court found, though, that a pledge to 
support a party's nominee is a “method of securing party candidates” 
and a proper exercise of a state’s right to appoint Electors in whatever 
manner the state chooses.93 Additionally, the Court held that the 
Twelfth Amendment, though it establishes that Electors must vote by 
ballot, implying some choice, does not bar an Elector pledging their 
choice before the election.94 The Court found there was a long history 
of an “implied or oral pledge” for a candidate.95 Lastly, the Court 
noted that its decision is applicable only to promises to vote a certain 
way at the primary election stage and may differ in the general election 
 
 87. 343 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1952). 
 88. Id. at 215. 
 89. Opinion of the Justices, 34 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1948); see Ray v. Blair, 57 So. 2d 395, 
398 (Ala. 1952). 
 90. Ray, 343 U.S. at 225. 
 91. Id. at 224. 
 92. Id. at 225. 
 93. Id. at 227. 
 94. Id. at 228. 
 95. Id. at 228–29. 
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because of “assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the 
Constitution.”96 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson argued that the original 
intent of the framers in creating the Electoral College was for Electors 
to be “free agents,” using their “independent and nonpartisan 
judgment.”97 Though advocating for the abolition of the Electoral 
College because it is a “mystifying and distorting factor in presidential 
elections,” Justice Jackson remarked that even if voting for a candidate 
to whom an Elector promised their vote is a normal practice, custom 
is not sufficient to amend the U.S. Constitution.98 Finally, Justice 
Jackson described the requirement that Electors promise to vote in 
such a way as “effect[ing] a complete suppression of competition 
between different views within the party.”99 
C.  Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado Department of State v. 
Baca 
In 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases that 
resulted in a lower court split, Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado 
Department of State v. Baca.100 In the wake of the 2016 election, both 
Democratic and Republican Party Electors across the country 
endeavored to prevent Donald Trump from entering the White 
House.101 These Electors dubbed themselves the “Hamilton Electors,” 
per Federalist Paper No. 68, in which Alexander Hamilton discussed 
the necessity of the Electoral College.102 Hamilton wrote that “[i]t was 
desirable” that the “men most capable” of selecting the President do 
so, in order to ensure that “the office of President will never fall to the 
lot of any man who is not . . . endowed with the requisite 
qualifications.”103 The Hamilton Electors hoped to unify enough 
Democratic and Republican Electors to either elect a moderate 
Republican “compromise candidate,” like Mitt Romney or John 
Kasich, or to at least divert enough Electoral votes to prevent Donald 
 
 96. Id. at 230. 
 97. Id. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 233–34. 
 99. Id. at 235. 
 100. 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 101. Lilly O’Donnell, Meet the ‘Hamilton Electors’ Hoping for an Electoral College Revolt, 
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/meet-the-
hamilton-electors-hoping-for-an-electoral-college-revolt/508433/. 
 102. Id. 
 103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Trump from reaching 270.104 Both Chiafalo and Baca involved these 
Hamilton Electors.105 
1.  Facts of the Cases 
Chiafalo involved the constitutionality of Washington’s Elector-
binding statute.106 Washington’s statute included a penalty for 
faithless votes.107 Its Elector-binding statute held that “[a]ny elector 
who votes for a person or persons not nominated by the party of which 
he or she is an elector is subject to a civil penalty of up to one thousand 
dollars.”108 Plaintiffs were Washington Democratic Party Electors, 
called upon to vote for the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, after 
she won the popular vote in Washington.109 The Washington Electors 
instead voted for Colin Powell as part of the Hamilton Electors 
movement.110 
In accordance with Washington’s penalty statute, the Washington 
Secretary of State fined the plaintiffs $1,000 each for violating their 
agreement to vote for the party nominee.111 The plaintiffs challenged 
this fine in the superior court, which upheld the fine as 
constitutional.112 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court, holding that the Constitution does not grant to Electors the 
discretion to vote unencumbered by any state restrictions.113 The court 
recognized the federal function that Electors perform, but reasoned 
that the Constitution “explicitly confers broad authority on the states” 
to determine the procedures by which Electors are appointed and 
conduct their federal function, citing both Ray v. Blair and McPherson 
v. Blacker.114 Subsequently, Washington’s statute was repealed and 
replaced with a statute calling for a Washington Elector who fails to 
 
 104. O’Donnell, supra note 101. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2322 (2020). 
 107. WASH. REV. CODE §29A.56.340 (2016) (amended 2019). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322. 
 110. O’Donnell, supra note 101; In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom. 
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). The plaintiffs also voted for a different vice 
president than vice presidential nominee, Tim Kaine. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 808. 
 111. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 808. 
 112. Id. at 809. 
 113. Id. at 817. 
 114. Id. at 814. 
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vote for the party’s candidate to be removed and replaced with an 
Elector who will vote for the party candidate.115 
Similarly, Baca involved Colorado’s Elector-binding statute.116 
Like Washington’s statute, Colorado’s provides that Electors shall 
vote for the candidate who wins the popular vote in that state, yet it 
fails to articulate any consequence or penalty for voting contrarily.117 
In Baca, Micheal Baca, an Elector for the Democratic Party in 
Colorado, cast his vote for John Kasich instead of Hillary Clinton in 
violation of the statute and after the Colorado Secretary of State had 
warned that violation of the oath may subject an Elector to perjury 
charges.118 Following Baca’s vote for Kasich, the Secretary of State 
removed Baca as an Elector, nullified his vote, replaced him with an 
Elector who voted for Clinton, and referred him to the Colorado 
Attorney General for criminal prosecution.119 Baca then sued, alleging 
a violation of his Article II and Twelfth Amendment rights.120 The 
Tenth Circuit preliminarily tackled the issue of whether Baca lacked 
standing to sue and determined that Baca had standing “based on his 
removal from his role of Elector and the cancellation of his vote.”121 
Additionally, the court discussed mootness, but found that the case 
was not moot because ruling on the issues will have an effect on the 
world and on Baca because he can receive nominal damages.122 
Unlike the Washington Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit 
ultimately found that Electors are free to exercise discretion in voting 
for whomever they choose.123 Its reasoning consistently emphasized 
that because there is no state removal power expressed in the 
Constitution, states cannot remove Electors.124 The court’s conclusion 
echoed its interpretation of the framers’ intent that “enlightened and 
 
 115. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29A.56.084, .090 (2020). 
 116. Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 117. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-304(5) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 7 of the 1st Reg. Sess. 
of the 73rd Gen. Assemb. (2021)). 
 118. Baca, 935 F.3d at 904. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 922. The standing issue presented in Baca is beyond the scope of this Note and will 
not be discussed further. 
 122. Id. at 928. Similarly, the mootness issue presented in Baca is beyond the scope of this Note 
and will not be discussed further. 
 123. Id. at 955–56. 
 124. See id. at 943. 
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respectable Electors” would be free to vote in their discretion to select 
the best candidate as President.125 
2.  Supreme Court Opinion 
The Supreme Court considered both Baca and Chiafalo together 
in its Chiafalo opinion.126 The Court held that states can unequivocally 
enforce Elector-binding statutes “for reasons much like those given in 
Ray.”127 The Court primarily surveyed the text of the U.S. 
Constitution.128 Given the U.S. Constitution’s sparse description of the 
Electoral College, the Court, mirroring the states’ arguments in both 
cases, found that the text of the U.S. Constitution does not prevent 
states from imposing penalties to prevent faithless Electors.129 
Additionally, based on the language in Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 
that states may appoint Electors however they choose, the Court 
concluded that states’ appointment power necessarily includes the 
ability to place conditions on appointment.130 An enforcement 
mechanism in the Elector-binding law is one such way to condition an 
Elector’s appointment.131 The Court also refuted the Electors’ 
argument that words like “ballot” and “vote” present in Article II, 
Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment necessitate that Electors 
possess discretion.132 Citing the historical precedent that most Electors 
have felt bound to reflect the voters’ preferences with their votes, the 
Court stated that “voting is still voting when discretion departs.”133 
In its analysis of the history of the Electoral College, the Court 
examined “long settled and established practice.”134 Particularly as 
political parties became engrained in American politics and the 
Twelfth Amendment was enacted, the “practice that had arisen in the 
Nation’s first elections” of Electors faithfully voting for their 
appointers’ preferred candidate was solidified.135 Washington and 
 
 125. Id. at 954. 
 126. See Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2316 (2020); Chiafalo v. Washington, 
140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323 (2020). 
 127. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323. 
 128. Id. at 2324. 
 129. Id. at 2324–25. 
 130. Id. at 2324. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 2325. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 2326. 
 135. Id. at 2327. 
(11) 54.4_LABRECQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:42 PM 
1316 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1299 
Colorado’s laws, along with all thirty-two other state Elector-binding 
statutes, “reflect[] a tradition more than two centuries old.”136 Finally, 
the Court highlighted that in U.S. history, the percentage of faithless 
votes that have been cast, excluding those cast when a party nominee 
has died, reflect only one half of one percent of the total Electoral 
votes cast.137 Thus, “neither text nor history” support the Electors’ 
arguments that they are able to cast faithless votes unfettered by state 
restrictions.138 
In a concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the states do not 
derive power to bind Electors from the appointment power in Article 
II, but rather from the Tenth Amendment, which holds that powers not 
delegated or prohibited in the U.S. Constitution are reserved to the 
states.139 
III.  STATES’ AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AND BIND ELECTORS 
A.  Statutes 
After the Supreme Court upheld the Alabama Elector-binding 
statute in Ray v. Blair, more states adopted similar Elector-binding 
laws.140 States want to control the allocation of their Electoral votes 
and maintain the status quo where Electors vote for the winner of the 
popular vote in their state.141 To that end, thirty-three states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted laws attempting to bind their 
Electors to vote for their party’s candidate after that candidate wins 
the popular vote in the state.142 Because the Supreme Court did not 
give states guidance on drafting these Elector-binding statutes, the 
statutes vary wildly between states in language, procedures, and 
penalties.143 
Scholars have previously categorized the Elector-binding statutes 
based on the statutes’ construction and outcomes.144 John Zadrozny, 
 
 136. Id. at 2328. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2329–35 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 140. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952); Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 223. 
 141. See Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 215. 
 142. See Appendix A. 
 143. Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 223. 
 144. Id. at 223–24. 
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for example, classified the state statutes into three distinct types.145 
The first type of statutes, according to Zadrozny, are “simple statutory 
declaration[s]” that Electors must vote according to the election 
results.146 The second type are state statutes that require Electors to 
take actual pledges that they will vote with their respective parties.147 
Lastly, under Zadrozny’s classification, the third type mandate that a 
faithless vote triggers resignation of the Elector and appointment of a 
new Elector who would vote faithfully.148 Zadrozny’s characterization 
of the statutes does not account for other types of penalties like fines 
or criminal action.149 
Additionally, Alexander Gouzoules, critiquing Zadrozny’s 
approach, divided the Elector-binding statutes into different 
categories.150 Gouzoules’s “more precise framework” uses two 
categories: deterrent-based statutes and invalidation-based statutes.151 
Under Gouzoules’s structure, state statutes that require a mere 
statutory declaration, those that require Electors to certify they will 
vote for a certain candidate, and those that impose penalties other than 
removal and replacement of the Elector are deterrent-based statutes.152 
On the other hand, invalidation-based statutes are those that require 
the removal and replacement of faithless Electors.153 
This Note provides a new and useful taxonomy of Elector-binding 
statutes that instead organizes the statutes in terms of their 
enforcement mechanisms. This enforcement-based approach was 
developed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo due to 
that decision’s focus on whether and by what means states can enforce 
these statutes.154 Additionally, this approach combines Zadrozny’s 
and Gouzoules’s approaches into a more specific organization. Like 
Zadrozny’s organization, this approach divides the statutes into three 
categories. However, Zadrozny’s taxonomy separates simple statutory 
declarations and pledges, when both have the same result in terms of 
 
 145. John A. Zadrozny, Comment, The Myth of Discretion: Why Presidential Electors Do Not 
Receive First Amendment Protection, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 165, 179 (2003). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 224. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 226. 
 154. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020). 
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enforcement, as explained below. Zadrozny’s grouping also does not 
take into account penalties apart from removal and replacement, which 
are notable in light of Chiafalo. Moreover, while Gouzoules’s 
framework is closer to an enforcement-based approach, the term 
“deterrent-based” is imprecise, as removal and replacement statutes 
can also deter Electors. 
Thus, under this Note’s classification, state statutes can be 
characterized as either: 
(1) “Honor System” statutes—the statute either contains a 
declaration that the Elector must vote for the party’s candidate or 
requires the Elector to take a pledge, but there is no explicit penalty 
for voting for someone other than the popular-vote-winning 
candidate;155 
(2) “Replacement” statutes—the statute requires that if the 
Elector fails to vote for the party’s candidate, the Elector will be 
removed and replaced with an Elector who will vote for the party 
candidate;156 and 
(3) “Penalty” statutes—the statute holds that voting for someone 
other than the party’s candidate results in some penalty, like a 
monetary fine.157 
Appendix A following this Note contains tables that group the 
statutes according to their categories.158 
1.  Honor System 
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
Honor System statutes that do not impose replacement, nor any 
penalty.159 This Honor System category encompasses both simple 
statutory declarations and state-mandated pledges, as both types of 
statutes do not contain enforcement mechanisms in their language. 
Delaware provides an example of a simple statutory declaration, 
stating that Electors “shall be required to cast their individual votes for 
the presidential and vice presidential nominees, or their legal 
 
 155. See Appendix A, Table 1. 
 156. See Appendix A, Table 2. 
 157. See Appendix A, Table 3. 
 158. Appendix A. 
 159. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Appendix A, Table 1. 
(11) 54.4_LABRECQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:42 PM 
2021] PATH TO A POPULAR VOTE 1319 
successors, of the political party that nominated the elector.”160 Other 
states require Electors to take an actual pledge.161 Oregon’s statute, for 
example, mandates that, when selected by their political party, 
Electors must “sign a pledge that, if elected, the candidate will vote in 
the electoral college for the candidates of the party for President and 
Vice President.”162 
Additionally, the Honor System category includes Maine, which 
does not have statutorily-prescribed penalties or consequences for 
faithless voting.163 However, in the 2016 election, an Elector voted for 
Bernie Sanders instead of the state’s popular vote winner, Hillary 
Clinton, in his first ballot, which was invalidated.164 The Elector’s vote 
for Sanders triggered a second vote, when he changed his vote to 
Clinton.165 Thus, on paper Maine is an Honor System state, but in 
practice, the state may utilize a rejected ballot type of enforcement. 
The Honor System category, however, does not include Colorado. 
On paper, Colorado looks like an Honor System statute, holding that 
“[e]ach presidential elector shall vote for the presidential candidate 
and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate who received the 
highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this 
state.”166 As explained above in the description for Baca, in the 2016 
election, an Elector voted for John Kasich instead of Hillary Clinton, 
and the Elector was removed from his position and replaced.167 
Despite no statutory replacement mechanism or penalty in Colorado, 
the state enforced by replacement. Thus, Colorado is categorized as a 
Replacement state. 
 
 160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4303(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of the 151st Gen. 
Assemb. (2021–2022)). 
 161. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 248.355(2) (West, Westlaw through laws enacted in the 
2021 Reg. Sess. of the 81st Leg. Assemb.). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See ME. STAT. tit. 21, § 805(2) (2020). 
 164. Rebecca Savransky, Maine Elector Switches Sanders Vote to Clinton, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 
2016, 11:20 AM) https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/311017-maine-elector-switches-
sanders-vote-to-clinton. 
 165. Id. 
 166. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-304 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 7 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of 
the 73rd Gen. Assemb. (2021)). 
 167. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019); see supra Section 
II.C. 
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2.  Replacement 
Eleven states require that Electors vote for their party’s candidate, 
or else they will be removed from office and replaced with an Elector 
who will vote for the party candidate.168 Six of the Replacement states 
have adopted this penalty as part of the Uniform Faithful Presidential 
Electors Act (UFPEA).169 Drafted by the Uniform Law Commission, 
the UFPEA provides language states can adopt, which includes a 
standard pledge and the remedy of replacement if an Elector votes 
contrary to the pledge.170 The Uniform Law Commission expresses 
that violation of the pledge “effectively constitute[es] resignation from 
the office of elector.”171 Nebraska’s adoption of the UFPEA, for 
example, contains a standard pledge in one section of the statute, 
slightly tweaked to reflect Nebraska’s district Electoral system, as well 
as the standard UFPEA remedy in the following section.172 The 
remedy section states that a “presidential elector who . . . attempts to 
present a ballot marked in violation of his or her pledge vacates the 
office of presidential Elector.”173 Though only six states have enacted 
this uniform statutory language, the five other Removal and 
Replacement states use similar language in their statutory 
construction.174 Iowa, for example, uses almost identical language, 
stating that an Elector who casts a faithless vote vacates the office of 
Elector.175 
Some states in this Replacement category first cancel a faithless 
vote that has been cast.176 Arizona provides an example of a state that 
first cancels the faithless vote, then removes and replaces the 
Elector.177 Under Arizona’s statute, if an Elector “knowingly refuses” 
 
 168. These states are: Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, and Washington. See Appendix A, Table 2. 
 169. These states are: Indiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Montana, and Washington. See 
Appendix A, Table 2. Washington only enacted the UFPEA in July of 2019 after the decision in In 
re Guerra. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.090(3) (2020). 
 170. Faithful Presidential Electors Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org 
/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6b56b4c1-5004-48a5-add2-0c410cce587d (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 32-713(2), 32-714 (2021). 
 173. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-714 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2d Reg. Sess. of 
the 106th Leg. (2020)). 
 174. See Appendix A, Table 2. 
 175. IOWA CODE § 54.8(3) (2021). 
 176. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 16-212 (2021). 
 177. See id. 
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to cast their vote for the winner of Arizona’s popular vote, the Elector 
is “no longer eligible” to serve as a presidential Elector, and the 
Elector is replaced with someone who casts the vote.178 
3.  Penalty 
The third category, Penalty statutes, is comprised of the 
remaining five states with Elector-binding laws.179 These statutes 
require Electors to vote for the party candidate and impose some sort 
of penalty, either in addition to or instead of replacement.180 For 
example, up until Washington adopted the UFPEA in 2019, the state 
previously imposed a $1,000 fine on Electors who voted for someone 
other than the popular vote winner.181 North Carolina’s current statute, 
on the other hand, requires an Elector who fails to vote for the party 
candidate to pay $500, vacate the office of Elector, and the Elector’s 
vote is nullified.182 Oklahoma, similarly, imposes a $1,000 fine in 
addition to replacement.183 
Some Penalty states threaten criminal action if a faithless vote is 
cast. California’s statute either imposes a $1,000 fine, imprisonment 
for anywhere from sixteen months to three years, or both a fine and 
imprisonment, if someone “knowingly or fraudulently acts in 
contravention” of the statute requiring Electors to cast their vote for 
the party candidate.184 New Mexico makes voting for someone other 
than the party candidate a fourth-degree felony, which comes with up 
to eighteen months in prison and/or a fine of up to $5,000.185 Finally, 
South Carolina requires that prospective Electors declare who they 
will vote for if elected, and if they ultimately do not vote for that 
candidate, they will be “punished according to law” for violating 
election law.186 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. These states are California, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. 
See Appendix A, Table 3. 
 180. See Appendix A, Table 3. 
 181. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 807–08 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Chiafalo v. 
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 182. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-212 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg. Sess. 
of the Gen. Assemb.). 
 183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 10-102, 10-109 (2021). 
 184. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18002 (Deering 2021). 
 185. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-9 (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation through Ch. 3 
of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg. (2021)); id. § 31-18-15. 
 186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (2020). 
(11) 54.4_LABRECQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:42 PM 
1322 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1299 
B.  Political Party/Candidate Vetting 
Instead of enacting statutes to bind Electors, another possible 
option for ensuring Electors do not vote faithlessly is for political 
parties in the various states to vet the Elector candidates more 
intensely to ensure the Elector will remain faithful.187 Ideally, the 
parties would pick people who are more loyal both to the parties and 
to the candidates. 
As the National Popular Vote organization explains, the current 
system in states without Elector-binding statutes relies on political 
parties vetting and selecting their Electors carefully.188 Though the 
National Popular Vote movement claims that this system of vetting 
Electors has worked reliably in the past and in the states that do not 
have Elector-binding laws, the rise in faithless Elector votes suggests 
otherwise.189 In 2016, of the ten Electors who cast faithless votes, two 
of them were from Texas, where there is no Elector-binding law.190 
On the other hand, Pennsylvania enacted a statute that requires the 
presidential candidates themselves to choose the party’s Elector 
slate.191 After being nominated by a political party, the presidential 
candidate then nominates “as many persons to be the candidates of his 
party for the office of presidential elector as the State is then entitled 
to.”192 No faithless votes were cast by Pennsylvania Electors in 
2016.193 This is, to be sure, a very small sample size, but it reflects the 
concern that political party vetting absent a statute may not be the most 
reliable solution, while Electors nominated by presidential candidates 
may be more effective. 
IV.  RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE NPV AND STATES 
During the Chiafalo oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked 
the attorney for the Electors, “assuming [the NPV] gathers enough 
support and becomes law, there’d be no way to enforce it [without 
 
 187. Supreme Court Unanimously Rules that States May Require Presidential Electors to be 
Faithful, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/faithless-elector-issue-
does-not-affect-operation-national-popular-vote (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Faithless Electors, supra note 65. 
 191. 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2878 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act 
1). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Faithless Electors, supra note 65. 
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Elector-binding laws]?”194 Lawrence Lessig, attorney for the Electors 
in Chiafalo, responded to Justice Roberts’ question by stating that “if 
there's a national popular vote compact, the number of electors for the 
winner would be so significant, it would be very hard to imagine any 
discretion affecting the ultimate result.”195 However, if only enough 
states join the NPV to secure the required 270 electoral votes to win 
the presidency, even one faithless vote from a state in the NPV could 
change the election. Of course, it is conceivable and potentially likely 
that more states than only the exact number required to get to 270 votes 
would join the NPV. Furthermore, there may be more states than just 
those in the NPV whose electoral votes end up directed to the national 
popular vote winner. However, states should not wait and see whether 
Electors in their state will vote faithlessly. States can take advantage 
of the Chiafalo decision to enforce their Elector-binding statute in any 
way they see fit. 
The Supreme Court’s decision has implications for the NPV, for 
states, and for political parties. Two major questions remain following 
the Chiafalo opinion: (1) What is the best way for states to enforce 
Elector votes to ensure the NPV can work effectively? and (2) Can and 
should political parties be cut out of the Elector-appointment process, 
particularly under the NPV? 
A.  Enforcement of Electors’ Votes 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Chiafalo that states can enforce 
Elector-binding statutes did not place any restrictions on the 
enforcement mechanisms that states may use.196 In fact, the case 
considered both the imposition of a fine on an Elector and the removal 
and replacement of an Elector, finding both enforcement mechanisms 
constitutional.197 Therefore, any of the three categories of Elector-
binding statutes—Honor System, Replacement, or Penalty—are 
constitutionally acceptable forms of Elector-binding statutes.198 
The states, and particularly states that have enacted the NPV, 
must determine the best way to ensure their Electors vote with the will 
of the people. As of the writing of this Note, twelve of the sixteen 
 
 194. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4:56, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No. 
19-465). 
 195. Id. at 5:02. 
 196. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2318. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
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states that have enacted the NPV also have Elector-binding laws.199 
The remaining four states that have enacted the NPV must also enact 
either Replacement or Penalty Elector-binding laws to prevent their 
Electors from invalidating the NPV completely.200 The NPV’s 
effectiveness in implementing a national popular vote election 
depends on Electors faithfully voting for the national popular vote 
winner. 
With the implications of the Chiafalo decision in mind, the 
Replacement statutes and Penalty statutes are the most effective 
solutions states can implement to ensure faithful Electors. First, Honor 
System statutes, which lack any enforcement mechanism, would not 
guarantee that the NPV would be effective. While Alexander 
Gouzoules categorizes these statutes as “deterrent-based,” there is no 
statutory or practical indication that these statutes actually deter 
Electors.201 Without a consequence for breaking the promise or 
pledge, or a penalty imposed, Electors would not be effectively 
deterred from voting for someone who does not win the national 
popular vote. A clear example of the lack of effectiveness of Honor 
System statutes can be seen in one of the faithless votes cast in the 
2016 presidential election. When the Electors convened to vote 
following the election, David Mulinix, an Elector from Hawaii, cast 
his vote for Bernie Sanders instead of Hillary Clinton because he 
purportedly believed the Electoral College is “outdated.”202 Hawaii’s 
Honor System statute simply states that the Electors “shall vote . . . for 
that person for president and that person for vice president of the 
United States, who are, respectively, the candidates of the political 
party or group which they represent.”203 Clearly, Mulinix was not 
deterred in any way from voting for someone other than Clinton, nor 
was he removed from his position of Elector or penalized in some 
other way. There is nothing in Honor System statutes that prevents 
Electors from voting for the popular vote winner, and these statutes 
cannot so simply be described as “deterrent-based.” 
 
 199. See Appendix A; Appendix B. 
 200. The states that have enacted the NPV but do not have elector binding laws are Illinois, 
New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. See Appendix A; Appendix B. 
 201. Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 224–25. 
 202. Julia Boccagno, Which Candidates Did the Seven “Faithless” Electors Support?, CBS 
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2016, 12:13 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/which-candidates-did-the-
seven-faithless-electors-support-election-2016/. 
 203. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14-28 (2020). 
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Weakness of Honor System statutes can also be seen in two other 
instances following the 2016 election. As discussed above, in Maine 
and Colorado, the states instituted enforcement of Electors’ faithless 
votes that were not statutorily-prescribed. In Maine, the Elector’s 
faithless vote triggered a second vote, in which the Elector voted 
faithfully.204 In Colorado, the Elector’s faithless vote resulted in the 
Elector’s replacement.205 If Honor System statutes are not just that, an 
honor system, then states ought to convert these statutes into Penalty 
or Replacement statutes, which do have spelled-out enforcement 
mechanisms. The workability of the NPV necessitates that state 
Elector-binding statutes carry some sort of consequence or penalty. 
Next, Penalty statutes are certainly better than Honor System 
statutes and may allow the NPV to work properly. However, the 
penalty would likely need to be significant for it to be effective, or 
possibly combined with another outcome like removal and 
replacement. Notably, the faithless Electors in Chiafalo were faced 
with a $1,000 fine and chose to vote in violation of the statute, 
nonetheless.206 If $1,000 is not enough, North Carolina’s $500 fine, 
for example, probably would not be enough by itself.207 North 
Carolina, though, removes and replaces the Elector in addition to the 
fine, which might be the most effective way to deter faithless votes.208 
Additionally, states could follow in New Mexico’s footsteps and make 
voting in violation of the statute a felony, which is more likely to be 
effective at deterring faithless votes than fines.209 It is unlikely that 
presidential Electors, many of them prominent members of their 
political party, would want to risk criminal action by voting 
faithlessly. Because Penalty statutes may be less of a deterrent for an 
Elector trying to make a statement or simply not caring about paying 
a fine in the event of a faithless vote, Replacement statutes may be the 
best option to ensure the effectiveness of the NPV. 
 
 204. See Savransky, supra note 164. 
 205. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 206. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, 
140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). 
 207. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-212 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg. 
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb., subject to changes made pursuant to direction of the Revisor of Statutes). 
 208. Id. 
 209. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-9 (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation through Ch. 3 
of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg. (2021)). 
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Replacement statutes would likely be the most effective form of 
Elector-binding statutes for NPV states because they combine the 
deterrent nature of Penalty statutes with the last resort of actually being 
removed from office. If a potential Elector is aware in advance that a 
faithless vote results in removal from the office, the person will most 
likely either choose not to be an Elector at all or will commit to vote 
for the national popular vote winner as required. In the event that an 
Elector is not sufficiently deterred by the statute itself and the prospect 
of removal, choosing to cast a faithless vote regardless, their vote will 
not count and the Elector will be replaced with someone who will vote 
faithfully. States could ensure that any replacement Elector will 
assuredly vote for the national popular vote winner. Additionally, the 
NPV organization endorsed the UFPEA as a potential option states 
could use in 2011, indicating that the organization itself believes that 
Replacement statutes would ensure the NPV would be able to work 
properly.210 Thus, Replacement statutes would be the best option to 
bind presidential Electors and allow the NPV to operate effectively. 
B.  Appointment of Electors, Political Parties, and the NPV 
Not long after the creation of the Electoral College and 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, political parties were entangled 
in the Electoral process, despite initial intentions to keep the Electoral 
College non-partisan.211 Today, parties remain heavily involved in the 
process. The Electors themselves, as they have been since the near 
beginning of the Electoral College, are often party members who are 
rewarded for their loyalties to the party with the Elector position.212 
Even beyond the practices of the parties themselves, states statutorily 
prescribe the role of the political parties in the Electoral process. The 
parties each must provide to the state a slate of Electors who will cast 
their votes in the event that party’s candidate wins the popular vote in 
the state.213 
 
 210. Supreme Court Unanimously Rules that States May Require Presidential Electors to be 
Faithful, supra note 187 (“In 2011, the National Popular Vote organization endorsed the ‘Uniform 
Faithful Presidential Electors Act . . .’ written by the Uniform Law Commission in 2010. The 
Supreme Court decision makes clear that the Uniform Law Commission’s proposed law is 
constitutional.”). 
 211. Robb, supra note 1, at 436. 
 212. Id. at 436–37; Kyle Cheney, Who Are the Electors?, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2016, 12:57 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/electoral-college-electors-232791. 
 213. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.30.020 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 32 and Ballot 
Measure 2 of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the 31st Leg.) (“Each political party shall select a number 
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While the incorporation of the political parties into the process 
makes practical sense, as party-nominated Electors would 
theoretically represent the will of the people who voted for their party 
candidate, the occurrence of faithless Electors illustrates that this is 
not always the case. In increasingly polarized elections, including 
contested primaries like the 2016 Democratic Primary that have the 
potential to fracture the political parties, involving the political parties 
so heavily makes less sense today.214 Particularly if the NPV were 
enacted into law by a sufficient number of states, the political parties 
likely can and should be cut out of the process to further ensure faithful 
votes for the national popular vote winner. 
The current mechanics of many state Elector-appointment laws, 
requiring each political party to appoint a slate of Electors to be called 
upon to vote if their party’s candidate wins, can be amended to cut the 
political parties out. Pennsylvania’s statute, for example, requires the 
candidates themselves to appoint the Electors, rather than the political 
parties.215 The statute describes that the “nominee of each political 
party for the office of President of the United States shall . . . nominate 
as many persons to be the candidates of his party for the office of 
presidential elector as the State is then entitled to.”216 In theory, a 
statute like Pennsylvania’s would result in Electors who are more loyal 
to the candidates themselves rather than merely the parties, and thus 
more likely to vote for the candidate who nominated them. 
Statutes like Pennsylvania’s would also work under the NPV. The 
text of the NPV bill provides that “the presidential elector certifying 
official of each member state shall certify the appointment in that 
official's own state of the elector slate nominated in that state in 
 
of candidates for electors of President and Vice-President of the United States equal to the number 
of senators and representatives to which the state is entitled in Congress. The candidates for electors 
shall be selected by the state party convention or in any other manner prescribed by the bylaws of 
the party. The chairperson and secretary of the state convention or any other party official 
designated by the party bylaws shall certify a list of the names of candidates for electors to the 
director on or before September 1 in presidential election years.”). 
 214. Cheney, supra note 212 (“But the most important factor—and the one contributing to 
recent unrest—is the fact that many electors were selected in the heat of a divisive and protracted 
2016 primary season. As a result, elector slates in many states were packed with supporters of 
Bernie Sanders and Ted Cruz, many of whom were left embittered by the outcome of divisive 
primaries.”). 
 215. 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2878 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act 
1). 
 216. Id. 
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association with the national popular vote winner.”217 The statute does 
not further clarify what “association with the national popular vote 
winner” means.218 The explanation of the bill on the National Popular 
Vote website includes references to the political party’s slate, but there 
does not appear to be anything in the text of the bill itself that prevents 
candidates themselves from nominating their Elector slate in each 
state.219 
Statutes like Pennsylvania’s, that rely on presidential candidate 
vetting of Elector candidates, are likely more effective for ensuring the 
NPV’s workability than an Honor System statute. These statutes can 
also be combined with Replacement or Penalty statutes to ensure 
faithful votes. With the combination of statutes, states all but 
guarantee that Electors who are appointed support the national popular 
vote winner, and if for some reason they do not and vote faithlessly, 
they will be removed or penalized. 
Finally, state governments could entirely cut both political parties 
and candidates out of the Electoral appointment process. The states 
could appoint a slate of Electors, without any personal or party loyalty 
involved. These Electors could be nominated in a non-partisan or 
multi-partisan fashion, or these Electors could include state 
government officials. The Elector slates would be appointed prior to 
an election. In order for this to work, though, states would need proper 
Elector-binding statutes in place. Replacement statutes would be the 
most effective in this instance, as Penalty statutes could allow party 
loyalists to incur penalties in order to vote for another candidate. With 
Replacement statutes, state government appointment of Electors 
would be even better than Pennsylvania’s approach. There is no 
necessary reason for political parties to be statutorily included under 
this system, and this could potentially open the door to allow third 
party candidates to win presidential elections. Removing the political 
parties from the statutorily-prescribed process may help preserve the 
integrity of presidential elections. 
 
 217. See KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, 
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/bill-text (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (“[I]f, for example, the 
Republican presidential slate is the national popular vote winner, the presidential electors 
nominated by the Republican Party in all states belonging to the compact would win election as 
members of the Electoral College in those states.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The increasingly polarizing nature of U.S. presidential elections 
has come to a head in recent years, and with only seventy-four 
remaining electoral votes needed to put it in motion, the National 
Popular Vote Plan is gaining traction in many states.220 The NPV, if 
enacted, has the potential to make individual voters’ votes count more, 
rather than having to be translated through a political party figure who 
may or may not vote with the will of the people. Now that the Supreme 
Court has decided that state Elector-binding statutes with enforcement 
mechanisms are constitutionally permissible, in order to ensure that 
the NPV can work, states in the NPV need to uniformly implement 
Replacement or Penalty statutes. Additionally, given the existence of 
and the ability for states to enact such statutes, the political parties can 
be taken out of the electoral appointment process to ensure the 
integrity of presidential elections and potentially neutralize some of 
the sharp partisanship in the U.S. 
  
 
 220. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, supra note 22. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE 1. HONOR SYSTEM STATUTES 
 
STATE CITATION TEXT OF 
STATUTE 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 17-
14-31 
Each person so listed 
[as an Elector] shall 
execute the following 
statement which shall 
be attached to the 
certificate or petition 
when the same is 
filed with the 
Secretary of State: “I 
do hereby consent 
and do hereby agree 
to serve as elector for 
President and Vice 
President of the 
United States, if 
elected to that 
position, and do 
hereby agree that, if 
so elected, I shall cast 
my ballot as such 
Elector for ________ 
for President and 
________ for Vice 
President of the 
United States” 
(inserting in the blank 
spaces the respective 
names of the persons 
named as nominees 
for the respective 
offices in the 
certificate to which 
this statement is 
attached). 
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Alaska ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. §§ 15.30.04, 
15.30.090 
§ 15.30.040: The 
party shall require 
from each candidate 
for elector a pledge 
that as an elector the 
person will vote for 
the candidates 
nominated by the 
party of which the 
person is a candidate. 
§ 15.30.090: After 
any vacancies have 
been filled, the 
electors shall proceed 
to cast their votes for 
the candidates for the 
office of President 
and Vice-President of 
the party that selected 
them as candidates 
for electors . . . and 
shall perform the 
duties of electors as 
required by the 
constitution and laws 
of the United States. 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 9-176 
Each such elector 
shall cast his ballots 
for the candidates 
under whose names 
he ran on the official 
election ballot, as 
provided in section 9-
175. If any such 
elector is absent or if 
there is a vacancy in 
the electoral college 
for any cause, the 
electors present shall, 
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before voting for 
President and Vice 
President, elect by 
ballot an elector to fill 
such vacancy, and the 
person so chosen 
shall be a presidential 
elector, shall perform 
the duties of such 
office and shall cast 
his ballots for the 
candidates to whom 
the elector he is 
replacing was 
pledged. 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 15, § 4303(b) 
In all cases, the 
electors chosen or 
appointed in this State 
for the election of a 
President and Vice 
President of the 
United States under 
this chapter shall be 
required to cast their 
individual votes for 
the presidential and 
vice presidential 
nominees, or their 
legal successors, of 
the political party that 
nominated the elector. 
District of 
Columbia 
D.C. CODE § 1-
1001.08(g) 
Each person elected 
as elector of President 
and Vice President 
shall, in the presence 
of the Board, take an 
oath or solemnly 
affirm that he or she 
will vote for the 
(11) 54.4_LABRECQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:42 PM 
2021] PATH TO A POPULAR VOTE 1333 
candidates of the 
party he or she has 
been nominated to 
represent, and it shall 
be his or her duty to 
vote in such manner 
in the electoral 
college. 
Florida FLA. STAT. 
§ 103.021(1) 
Each such elector 
shall be a qualified 
elector of the party he 
or she represents who 
has taken an oath that 
he or she will vote for 
the candidates of the 
party that he or she is 
nominated to 
represent. 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 14-28 
The electors, when 
convened, if both 
candidates are alive, 
shall vote by ballot 
for that person for 
president and that 
person for vice 
president of the 
United States, who 
are, respectively, the 
candidates of the 
political party or 
group which they 
represent, one of 
whom, at least, is not 
an inhabitant of this 
State. 
Maine ME. STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 805(2) 
The presidential 
electors at large shall 
cast their ballots for 
the presidential and 
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vice-presidential 
candidates who 
received the largest 
number of votes in 
the State according to 
the ranked-choice 
method of counting 
votes described in 
section 723-A. The 
presidential electors 
of each congressional 
district shall cast their 




received the largest 
number of votes in 
each respective 
congressional district 
according to the 
ranked-choice method 
of counting votes 
described in section 
723-A. 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., 
ELEC. LAW § 8-
505(c) 
After taking the oath 
prescribed by Article 
I, § 9 of the Maryland 
Constitution before 
the Clerk of the Court 
of Appeals or, in the 
Clerk’s absence, 
before one of the 
Clerk’s deputies, the 
presidential Electors 
shall cast their votes 
for the candidates for 
President and Vice 
President who 
received a plurality of 
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the votes cast in [the 
State of Maryland]. 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 53, § 8 
Said acceptance form 
shall include a pledge 
by the presidential 
elector to vote for the 
candidate named in 
the filing. 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-15-785(3) 
Each person so listed 
shall execute the 
following statement 
which shall be 
attached to the 
certificate or petition 
when it is filed with 
the State Board of 
Election 
Commissioners: “I do 
hereby consent and 
do hereby agree to 
serve as elector for 
President and Vice 
President of the 
United States, if 
elected to that 
position, and do 
hereby agree that, if 
so elected, I shall cast 
my ballot as such for 
.......... for President 
and .......... for Vice 
President of the 
United States” 
(inserting in said 
blank spaces the 
respective names of 
the persons named as 
nominees for said 
respective offices in 
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the certificate to 
which this statement 
is attached). 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3505.40 
A presidential elector 
elected at a general 
election or appointed 
pursuant to section 
3505.39 of the 
Revised Code shall, 
when discharging the 
duties enjoined upon 
him by the 
constitution or laws 
of the United States, 
cast his electoral vote 
for the nominees for 
president and vice-
president of the 
political party which 
certified him to the 
secretary of state as a 
presidential elector 
pursuant to law. 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 248.355(2) 
A candidate for 
elector when selected 
shall sign a pledge 
that, if elected, the 
candidate will vote in 
the electoral college 
for the candidates of 
the party for President 
and Vice President. 
The Secretary of State 
shall prescribe the 
form of the pledge. 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-15-104(C)(1) 
The electors shall cast 
their ballots in the 
electoral college for 
the candidates of the 
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political party which 
nominated them as 
electors if both 
candidates are alive. 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17, § 2732 
The electors must 
vote for the 
candidates for 
President and Vice 
President who 
received the greatest 
number of votes at 
the general election. 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 24.2-203 
Electors selected by 
the state convention 
of any political party 
as defined in § 24.2-
101 shall be required 
to vote for the 
nominees of the 
national convention 
to which the state 
convention elects 
delegates. 




convened, shall vote 
by ballot for that 
person for president 
and that person for 
vice president who 
are, respectively, the 
candidates of the 
political party which 
nominated them 
under s. 8.18, the 
candidates whose 
names appeared on 
the nomination papers 
filed under s. 8.20, or 
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the candidate or 
candidates who filed 
their names under s. 
8.185(2), except that 
at least one of the 
persons for whom the 
electors vote may not 
be an inhabitant of 
this state. A 
presidential elector is 
not required to vote 
for a candidate who is 
deceased at the time 
of the meeting. 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-19-108 
All Wyoming electors 
shall vote for the 
candidates for the 
office of president 
and vice-president 
receiving the highest 
number of votes in 
the Wyoming general 
election. 
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TABLE 2. REPLACEMENT STATUTES 
 
STATE CITATION TEXT OF STATUTE 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 16-212 
§ 16-212(B): After the 
secretary of state issues the 
statewide canvass containing 
the results of a presidential 
election, the presidential 
electors of this state shall cast 
their electoral college votes for 
the candidate for president and 
the candidate for vice 
president who jointly received 
the highest number of votes in 
this state as prescribed in the 
canvass. 
§ 16-212(C): A presidential 
elector who knowingly refuses 
to cast that elector’s electoral 
college vote as prescribed in 
subsection B of this section is 
no longer eligible to hold the 
office of presidential Elector 
and that office is deemed and 
declared vacant by operation 
of law. The chairperson of the 
state committee of the political 
party represented by that 
elector shall appoint a person 
who is otherwise qualified to 
be a presidential elector. The 
replacement presidential 
elector shall cast the elector’s 
electoral college vote as 
prescribed by this section. 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-4-304 
§ 1-4-304(1): The presidential 
electors shall convene at the 
capital of the state, in the 
office of the governor at the 
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capitol building, on the first 
Monday after the second 
Wednesday in the first 
December following their 
election at the hour of 12 noon 
and take the oath required by 
law for presidential electors. If 
any vacancy occurs in the 
office of a presidential elector 
because of death, refusal to 
act, absence, or other cause, 
the presidential electors 
present shall immediately 
proceed to fill the vacancy in 
the electoral college. When all 
vacancies have been filled, the 
presidential electors shall 
proceed to perform the duties 
required of them by the 
constitution and laws of the 
United States. 
§ 1-4-304(5): Each presidential 
elector shall vote for the 
presidential candidate and, by 
separate ballot, vice-
presidential candidate who 
received the highest number of 
votes at the preceding general 





IND. CODE §§ 3-
10-4-1.7(a), 3-10-
4-9(d) 
§ 3-10-4-1.7(a): Each 
presidential elector nominee 
and each alternate presidential 
elector nominee of a political 
party shall execute the 
following pledge: “If selected 
for the office of presidential 
elector, I agree to serve and to 
mark my ballots for President 
and Vice President for the 
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nominees for those offices of 
the party that nominated me.” 
§ 3-10-4-9(d): A presidential 
elector who refuses to present 
a ballot, presents an unmarked 
ballot, or presents a ballot 
marked in violation of the 
presidential elector’s pledge 
executed under section 1.7 or 
8(c) of this chapter, vacates the 
office of presidential elector. 
The vacant presidential elector 
office shall be filled as 
provided in section 8 of this 
chapter. 
Iowa IOWA CODE § 54.8 § 54.8(2): Except as otherwise 
provided by law of this state 
outside of this chapter, each 
elector shall present both 
completed ballots to the state 
commissioner who shall 
examine the ballots and accept 
and cast all ballots of electors 
whose votes are consistent 
with their pledges executed 
under section 54.5 or 54.7. 
Except as otherwise provided 
by law of this state outside of 
this chapter, the state 
commissioner shall not accept 
and shall not count an elector’s 
presidential and vice 
presidential ballots if the 
elector has not marked both 
ballots or has marked one 
ballot in violation of the 
elector’s pledge. 
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§ 54.8(3): An elector who 
refuses to present a ballot, 
presents an unmarked ballot, 
or presents a ballot marked in 
violation of the elector’s 
pledge executed under section 
54.5 or 54.7 vacates the office 
of elector. The state 
commissioner shall declare the 
creation of the vacancy and fill 
the vacancy pursuant to 
section 54.7. 
Michigan MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 168.47 
Refusal or failure to vote for 
the candidates for president 
and vice-president appearing 
on the Michigan ballot of the 
political party which 
nominated the elector 
constitutes a resignation from 
the office of elector, his vote 
shall not be recorded and the 
remaining electors shall 





MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 208.43, 
208.46(c) 
§ 208.43: Each elector 
nominee and alternate elector 
nominee of a political party 
shall execute the following 
pledge: “If selected for the 
position of elector, I agree to 
serve and to mark my ballots 
for president and vice 
president for the nominees for 
those offices of the party that 
nominated me.” 
§ 208.46(c): An elector who 
refuses to present a ballot, 
presents an unmarked ballot, 
or presents a ballot marked in 
violation of the elector’s 
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pledge executed under section 
208.43 or 208.45, paragraph 
(c), vacates the office of 
elector, creating a vacant 









§ 13-25-304: Each Elector 
nominated by a political party 
under 13-25-101 or by an 
unaffiliated presidential 
candidate shall execute the 
following pledge: “If selected 
for the position of Elector, I 
agree to serve and to mark my 
ballots for president and vice 
president for the nominees of 
the political party that 
nominated me.” The executed 
pledges must accompany the 
submission of the 
corresponding names to the 
secretary of state under 13-25-
101(1). 
§ 13-25-307(4): An elector 
who refuses to present a ballot, 
presents an unmarked ballot, 
or presents a ballot in violation 
of the elector’s pledge 
executed under 13-25-304 or 
13-25-306(3) vacates the 
office of elector, creating a 






NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 32-713(2): Each presidential 
elector shall execute the 
following pledge: As a 
presidential elector duly 
selected (or appointed) for this 
position, I agree to serve and 
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§§ 32-713(2), 32-
714(4) 
to mark my ballots for 
President and Vice President 
for the presidential and vice-
presidential candidates who 
received the highest number of 
votes in the state if I am an at-
large presidential elector or the 
highest number of votes in my 
congressional district if I am a 
congressional district 
presidential elector. 
§ 32-714(4): A presidential 
Elector who refuses to present 
a ballot, who attempts to 
present an unmarked ballot, or 
who attempts to present a 
ballot marked in violation of 
his or her pledge vacates the 





NEV. REV. STAT. 
§§ 298.065(5), 
298.075 
§ 298.065(5): Except as 
otherwise provided in 
subsection 6, a person 
appointed to the position of 
presidential elector pursuant to 
this section may not serve in 
that position unless the person 
signs a pledge in substantially 
the following form: I agree to 
serve as a presidential elector 
and to vote only for the 
nominees for President and 
Vice President of the party or 
the independent candidates 
who received the highest 
number of votes in this State at 
the general election. 
§ 298.075: Does not present 
both ballots, presents an 
unmarked ballot or presents a 
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ballot marked with a vote that 
does not conform with the 
provisions of subsection 1: (1) 
The Secretary of State shall 
refuse to accept either ballot of 
the presidential elector; and (2) 
The Secretary of State shall 
deem the presidential elector’s 
position vacant. The vacancy 
must be filled pursuant to the 
provisions of NRS 298.065. 
The person appointed to fill 
the vacancy in the position of 
presidential elector, after 
signing the pledge described in 
NRS 298.065, shall mark both 
ballots and present both ballots 
to the Secretary of State 
pursuant to this section. 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 20A-13-304(3) 
Any elector who casts an 
electoral ballot for an 
individual not nominated by 
the individual, or by the party 
of which the elector is an 
elector, except in the cases of 
death or felony conviction of a 
candidate, is considered to 
have resigned from the office 
of elector, the elector’s vote 
may not be recorded, and the 
remaining electors shall 
appoint another individual to 







§ 29A.56.084: Each elector 
nominee and alternate elector 
nominee of a political party 
shall execute the following 
pledge: “If selected for the 
position of elector, I agree to 
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29A.56.084, 
29A.56.090 
serve and to mark my ballots 
for president and vice 
president for the nominees for 
those offices of the party that 
nominated me.” Each elector 
nominee and alternate elector 
nominee of an unaffiliated 
presidential candidate shall 
execute the following pledge: 
“If selected for the position of 
elector as a nominee of an 
unaffiliated presidential 
candidate, I agree to serve and 
to mark my ballots for that 
candidate and for that 
candidate’s vice presidential 
running mate.” The executed 
pledges must accompany the 
submission of the 
corresponding names to the 
secretary of state. 
§ 29A.56.090(3): An elector 
who refuses to present a ballot, 
presents an unmarked ballot, 
or presents a ballot marked in 
violation of the elector’s 
pledge executed under RCW 
29A.56.084 or 29A.56.088(3) 
vacates the office of elector, 
creating a vacant position to be 
filled under RCW 29A.56.088. 
 
 
TABLE 3. PENALTY STATUTES 
 
STATE CITATION PENALTY TEXT OF 
STATUTE 
California CAL. ELEC. 
CODE 
$1,000 fine or 
imprisonment 
§ 6906: The 
electors, when 
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are alive, shall 
vote by ballot 
for that person 
for President 
and that person 
for Vice 








one of whom, at 
least, is not an 
inhabitant of 
this state. 




any duty under 
any law of this 





perform it, or 






or violation of 
any of those 
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of Section 1170 
of the Penal 
Code for 16 
months or two 
or three years, 
or by both that 
fine and 
imprisonment. 




felony (up to 
18 months in 
prison and/or 





§ 1-15-9(A): All 
presidential 
electors shall 
cast their ballots 
in the electoral 










casts his ballot 
in violation of 
the provisions 
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contained in 
Subsection A of 
this section is 














consent to serve 
as such, who 
fails to attend 
and vote for the 







of the United 
States at the 
time and place 
directed in G.S. 
163-210 (except 





forfeit and pay 
to the State five 
hundred dollars 
($500.00), to be 
recovered by the 
Attorney 
General in the 
Superior Court 
of Wake 
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County. In 
addition to such 
forfeiture, 
refusal or failure 








the office of 
elector, his vote 













up to $1,000 
fine 




subscribe to an 
oath, stating that 
said nominee, if 
elected, will cast 
a ballot for the 
persons 
nominated for 





party . . . 
Refusal or 
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failure to vote 
by a Presidential 
Elector for the 
persons 
nominated for 






a violation of 
the oath and 
shall result in 
the immediate 
forfeiture of the 
Elector’s office. 
In such event, 
the vote shall 
not be recorded, 
a vacancy shall 
be declared, and 
the Presidential 
Electors present 





of this title. 
§ 10-109: Any 
Presidential 
Elector who 
violates his oath 
as a Presidential 
Elector shall be 
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thereof, shall be 
punished by a 



















he will vote for 
if elected. Those 
elected shall 







to fill a vacancy 
in the electoral 
college shall 
vote for the 
candidates the 
elector whose 




shall be made to 
the Secretary of 
State on such 
form as he may 
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require not later 
than sixty days 
prior to the 
general election 





have his name 
placed on the 
ballot who fails 






to the provisions 
of this section 
shall be deemed 
guilty of 
violating the 
election laws of 








have the right to 
institute proper 
action to require 
compliance with 
the provisions 
of this section. 
The Attorney 
General shall 
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institute 
criminal action 
for any violation 
of the provision 




the party from 
which an elector 




elector from the 
obligation to 
vote for a 
specific 
candidate when, 
in its judgment, 
circumstances 
shall have arisen 
which, in the 
opinion of the 
committee, it 
would not be in 
the best interest 
of the State for 
the elector to 
cast his ballot 
for such a 
candidate. 
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APPENDIX B 







Alabama Not Enacted Honor System 
Alaska Not Enacted Honor System 
Arizona Not Enacted Replacement 
Arkansas Not Enacted No Statute 
California Enacted in CAL. 
ELEC. CODE 
§§ 6920, 6921 
Penalty 
Colorado Enacted and subject 
to statewide vote in 
November 2020 
Replacement 
Connecticut Enacted in 2018 
Conn. Pub. Act No. 
18-9 
Honor System 
Delaware Enacted in DEL. 





Enacted in D.C. 
CODE § 1-1051.01 
Honor System 
Florida Not Enacted Honor System 
Georgia Not Enacted No Statute 
Hawaii Enacted in HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 14D-1 
Honor System 
Idaho Not Enacted No Statute 
Illinois Enacted in 10 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 
20/5 
No Statute 
Indiana Not Enacted Replacement 
Iowa Not Enacted Replacement 
Kansas Not Enacted No Statute 
Kentucky Not Enacted No Statute 
Louisiana Not Enacted No Statute 
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Maine Not Enacted Honor System 
Maryland Enacted in MD. 
CODE ANN., ELEC. 
LAW § 8-5A-01 
Honor System 
Massachusetts Enacted in An Act 
Relative to the 
Agreement Among 
the States to Elect 
the President by 
National Popular 
Vote, ch. 229, 2010 
Mass. Acts 
Honor System 
Michigan Not Enacted Replacement 
Minnesota Not Enacted Replacement 
Mississippi Not Enacted Honor System 
Missouri Not Enacted No Statute 
Montana Not Enacted Replacement 
Nebraska Not Enacted Replacement 
Nevada Not Enacted Replacement 
New Hampshire Not Enacted No Statute 




New Mexico Enacted in N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-15-
4.1 
Penalty 
New York Enacted in N.Y. 
ELEC. LAW § 12-
402 
No Statute 
North Carolina Not Enacted Penalty 
North Dakota Not Enacted No Statute 
Ohio Not Enacted Honor System 
Oklahoma Not Enacted Penalty 
Oregon Enacted by S.B. 
870, 80th Leg. 
Assemb., 2019 
Reg. Sess. (Or. 
2019) (not codified 
as of this writing) 
Honor System 
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Pennsylvania Not Enacted No Statute 
Rhode Island Enacted in 17 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 17-4.2-1 
No Statute 
South Carolina Not Enacted Penalty 
South Dakota Not Enacted No Statute 
Tennessee Not Enacted Honor System 
Texas Not Enacted No Statute 
Utah Not Enacted Replacement 
Vermont Enacted in VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 
§§ 2751–2755 
Honor System 
Virginia Not Enacted Honor System 




West Virginia Not Enacted No Statute 
Wisconsin Not Enacted Honor System 
Wyoming Not Enacted Honor System 
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